We apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to identify the impact of (exogenous) partisan alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. According to our results, municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the President receive larger transfers by about 36%-43% in the last two years of the term. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next (close) electoral race. We also find that politically motivated transfers are larger for second-term mayors-who may have more political connections, weaker reelection incentives, or stronger incentives to run for higher offices-and for small municipalities without a radio station, where the mayor can more easily claim political credit for transfers.
Introduction
In a federal state, transfers from the central government to lower-tier administrative units are a crucial ingredient both for the efficient provision of public goods and services, and for the political competition between parties (or coalitions) at different levels of government. A large body of research in public finance and political economy has investigated the (normative) implications and the (positive) determinants of intergovernmental transfers, respectively.
1 From a political economy perspective, it is hard to believe that the central government-based on either its own preferences or the presence of institutional and political constraints-ends up acting as a benevolent social planner. Indeed, although federations usually adopt allocation rules that shelter the distribution of intergovernmental grants from political distortions, incumbent politicians at various layers of government can still take advantage of a lot of discretionary policy instruments to tease voters.
In this paper, we apply a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close electoral races, in the spirit of Lee (2008) , in order to identify the impact of partisan alignment on the amount of federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. Indeed, if random factors-for example, unexpected breaking news or rain on election day-played even a small role in deciding electoral outcomes, the victory of the political coalition aligned with the Brazilian President would mimic random assignment in those municipal elections decided by a narrow margin. The RDD setup therefore delivers a clean source of exogenous variation in partisan alignment. In the empirical analysis, we construct three different measures of partisan alignment according to the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or political party of the Brazilian President.
The theoretical literature has provided different explanations for politically motivated transfers, or tactical redistribution. On one hand, incumbent parties may use intergovernmental grants to increase their (or their allies') reelection probability at the central and local level, therefore allocating larger transfers to localities where swing voters are overrepresented (see Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1998) . On the other hand, incumbent parties may use transfers to reward their core supporters (see Cox and McCubbins, 1986) .
2 Furthermore, as far as the local government can claim political credit for the money the central government is allocating, partisan alignment between the two levels of government-that is, the fact that they belong to the same political coalition-should increase the amount of transfers (see Arulampalam et al., 2009 ).
Testing the above predictions empirically has proven to be a difficult endeavour. In particular, without a credible source of exogenous variation in partisan alignment, the empirical correlation between alignment and larger transfers (if any) could be completely driven by (local) socio-economic conditions affecting both electoral outcomes and resource allocation. Most of the early studies have tackled the issue with a "selection on observables" assumption, controlling for different measures of the normative and political determinants of intergovernmental grants. For the US, Grossman (1994) finds that the similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians increases grants made to a state; Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that the share of democratic voters is an important predictor of federal transfers to a district, especially in years of democratic control in Congress. For Australia, Worthington and Dollery (1998) also detect tactical distribution of grants. This approach, however, is likely to suffer from a problem of omitted bias.
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) improve upon the existing literature with a difference-in-differences strategy, both across time (exploiting the within-municipality variation in partisan alignment induced by subsequent elections) and across grantors (exploiting the within-municipality variation in partisan alignment with different layers of government). They use data on Spain and find that municipalities aligned with the two upper-tier governments receive over 40% more grants than the others. Arulampalam et al. (2009) also control for (time-invariant) confounding factors at the state level in India, and find that aligned states receive larger grants, especially if they are swing states. Finally, for Portugal, Veiga and Pinho (2007) use a fixed-effect specification and find evidence of distortions favoring municipalities ruled by the Prime Minister's party during the early years of democracy, but not in the period of established democracy. Yet, unobservable confounders might be time-varying as well. For example, the occurrence of an international economic crisis could swing a large fraction of voters in export-oriented regions toward a given political party, and at the central level this party could decide to favor the same regions because of its policy preferences rather than tactical motivations.
From the above literature, we borrow the idea that higher revenues can be exploited by incumbent politicians to increase their chance of winning the election at the municipal or federal level, depending on which layer of government is able to obtain political credit for the transferred resources.
3 The RDD setup we use in this paper, however, improves internal validity by controlling for both time-invariant and time-varying confounders.
Our econometric strategy not only comes with the advantage of improving internal validity, but also addresses an additional question emerged in the literature: The interaction between the degree of political competition and partisan alignment in determining the tactical distribution of central-level transfers. Arulampalam et al. (2009) build a theoretical model where this interaction plays a crucial role. If the central government were able to obtain full political credit for the transferred resources, it would be indifferent between benefiting aligned or unaligned municipalities. On the contrary, if voters were unable to distinguish the source of the grants and there were some leakage in their goodwill toward the federal government, aligned municipalities should receive more transfers. Furthermore, among aligned municipalities, those where the incumbent won by a narrow margin should receive more. By the same token, among unaligned municipalities, those where the incumbent won by a narrow margin should receive less, because the federal government wants to tie the hands of its (political) enemies in the next election. For the institutional and political reasons discussed in Section 2.2, Brazil is a setting where the above "goodwill leakage" is likely to be sizable. Focusing on close elections therefore allows us to shed light on the interplay between political competition and partisan alignment.
At the end of the day, the only limitation of the RDD setup is due to the fact that, in order to ensure internal validity, we must restrict the sample to electoral races where there are only two candidates and one of them is affiliated with the President's coalition, which amount to 33% of all electoral races. Although the sample restriction only affects external validity, we address this limitation by comparing two-man races with all the rest. We also present benchmark estimation results with OLS and difference-in-differences specifications both in the all sample and in two-man races. The descriptive statistics show that two-man races are mainly concentrated in municipalities with smaller population, lower per-capita income, and poorer infrastructures. As a result, these municipalities end up receiving more federal transfers over the mayoral mandate. According to OLS, the correlation between partisan alignment and federal transfers is identical in the two samples, while the difference-in-differences estimator, which accommodates for time-invariant confounders, detects a higher correlation in the sample of two-man races, where the marginal impact of public expenditure on voters' utility is also likely to be higher.
According to our RDD estimates, municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the political coalition of the Brazilian president receive larger federal transfers by 36%-43%
(depending on the estimation methods) in the last two years of the mayoral mandate, that is, when the next municipal elections are approaching. During the first two years of the mandate-when instead federal elections are approaching-we find no evidence of partisan distortions in the allocation of transfers. This is also consistent with the "goodwill leakage" hypothesis discussed above, as it seems that opportunistic grants take place in proximity of municipal rather than federal elections. Interestingly, the effect we find is driven by a sizable cut in transfers to unaligned municipalities close to the threshold of zero margin of victory. In other words, there is evidence that the federal government penalizes municipalities ruled by mayors belonging to the opposition coalition, especially if they won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands in close electoral races.
We also detect significant heterogeneity results. The effect of partisan alignment on transfers is much higher for second-term mayors, in municipalities without a radio station, and in small towns. The larger (politically motivated) transfers received by second-term mayors might have a twofold explanation: On one hand, politicians with longer experience might count on stronger political connections; on the other hand, the central government might want to compensate for the lower effort of aligned mayors without reelection incentives. The absence of a radio station and the small population size-two features that are difficult to disentangle in the Brazilian data-might instead allow the mayor to claim more credit for the increased revenues, therefore raising the political reward from intergovernmental grants. In small municipalities, in fact, local institutions may well be the major source of political information for citizens, while the presence of a radio station may increase the ability of the President or congressmen to publicize their role in allocating federal resources to a given municipality.
4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the Brazilian institutional framework, mainly the political system and the allocation of federal transfers. In Section 3, we present our econometric strategy. In Section 4, we discuss the data sources, the sample selection procedure, and the variables of interest. In Section 5, we present the empirical results. We conclude with Section 6. municipal governments are strongly dependent on these transfers for their budget (as a matter of fact, tax revenues average to only 5.5% of municipal total revenues).
In this study, we focus on discretionary federal transfers devoted to infrastructure projects, which amount to about 15% of total municipal expenditure in infrastructures.
These transfers are related to budget items that involve the construction of buildings and bridges, the paving of roads, the building of water systems and sewer linkage, the purchase of ambulances, and so on. We focus on this type of federal transfers because the bulk of the other revenues are largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate. Furthermore, such transfers are used to finance highly visible projects, that is, they are an ideal target for politicians willing to tease voters.
In order to analyze the allocation of discretionary federal transfers, it is crucial to understand how the legislative bargaining process works at the federal level. Because of the institutional and political context described above, the President usually faces the hard task of passing his legislative agenda in a Congress where there are about 18 parties, and where the President's party usually controls less than 20 percent of the seats. Political institutions, however, provide him with a wide array of instruments to unify his coalition in Congress, and discretionary transfers to targeted areas are one of them.
Basically, the annual budget law (Lei Orçamentária Anual, LOA) is first drafted by the executive and then subject to amendments added by legislators (both individually and collectively). In most cases, the municipalities that will receive the (discretionary) grants are chosen by the legislators, as the bulk of the proposed amendments include benefits to local areas, trying to bring the pork home. The Budget Committee is responsible for the authorization of the bill. After a period of discussion, Congress votes for the budget law, which is then sent to the President for the final decision. As the budget law is not mandatory in Brazil, however, the President has a major role in deciding the allocation of the discretionary transfers, and he can use them to make congressmen follow the guidelines of the government coalition. On the other hand, municipal governments should also exert some effort to apply for these transfers. A budgetary amendment can be executed only if an agreement (i.e., CONVÊNIO) between the municipal administration and the central government is signed.
At the end of the day, voters in a given municipality will receive discretionary transfers depending on three factors: (i) The effort of their municipal administration in applying for these transfers; (ii) the interests of a federal congressman in supporting the municipality;
and (iii) the interest of the President in executing the budget amendment (that is, send the money exactly to that municipality). The political reward in terms of votes can accrue to any of these subjects. Yet, the mayor of the municipality will probably obtain the lion's share of the political credit for the higher municipal revenues, especially when voters are not sufficiently informed about the source of the grant, or when there is low competition in claiming credit (e.g., in small municipalities with just one congressman).
Econometric strategy
We are interested in estimating the causal effect of the treatment "being politically aligned with the President" on the amount of (discretionary) federal transfers. Using Rubin's (1974) potential-outcome framework, define T im (1) as the potential transfers received by municipality i, during the administrative mandate m, in case the mayor is politically aligned with the President, and T im (0) as the potential transfers of the same municipality in case the mayor is not politically aligned with the President. The variable A im defines the treatment status of i: A im = 1 if there is partisan alignment, and A im = 0 otherwise.
The observed outcome is thus:
interest is the average treatment effect:
Define W i as a set of relevant town-specific covariates (including state fixed effects), X im as a set of (mandate-varying) mayoral characteristics, and δ m as mandate fixed effects.
In the OLS estimation
the estimatedτ is based on the conditional comparison of the observed transfers of aligned and unaligned municipalities, which does not generally provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect, as long as towns with different unobservable characteristics affecting federal transfers self-select into partisan alignment by voting for different parties.
A difference-in-differences estimator can instead control for time-invariant confounding factors by means of municipality fixed effects γ i :
Also in this estimation, however,τ might fall short of providing an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect. In particular, unobservable confounders might be timevarying as well. This would happen if, for example, following an international economic crisis, a large fraction of the electorate in export-oriented regions decided to vote for a given political party and, at the federal level, this party decided to favor the same regions because of its policy preferences rather than tactical motivations.
In order to deal with the presence of both time-invariant and time-varying confounders, we therefore implement an RDD strategy in the spirit of Lee (2008) and compare municipalities where the politically aligned candidate barely won with municipalities where the politically aligned candidate barely lost. 5 Specifically, we calculate the margin of victory of the candidate for mayor politically aligned with the Brazilian President in each municipality i and mandate m (M V P im ). 6 This measure is thus positive in municipalities where the mayor belongs to the federal government coalition, and negative otherwise. At the threshold of zero margin of victory, M V P im = 0, partisan alignment sharply changes from zero to one. This treatment assignment mechanism is an example of sharp RDD.
M V P im can be seen as a random variable depending on observable and unobservable town characteristics, as well as on random shocks on election day. Lee (2008) shows that, in this setup, RDD identification requires that: (i) For each political candidate, the probability of winning is never equal to zero or one; (ii) for each political candidate, the probabilities of winning or losing the election by a narrow margin are identical. 7 In other words, electoral outcomes depend on both predictable elements and random chance, which is then crucial only for close races. For instance, heavy rain on election day may influence turnout and, as a result, the victory of one candidate over the other in marginal municipalities. The average treatment effect in close races can thus be identified as:
Note that this is a local effect, which cannot be extrapolated to the whole population without additional homogeneity assumptions. But this local effect, defined for close electoral races only, has first-order theoretical relevance in our case, because it sheds light on the tactical allocation of federal transfers in marginal municipalities. The only price we have to pay to obtain internal validity is a loss in external validity: To achieve an assignment mechanism to partisan alignment which is as good as random in close elections, we must restrict the sample to electoral races with only two political candidates, one of whom is politically affiliated with the Brazilian President.
Various methods can be used to estimate the above local average treatment effect.
We first apply a split polynomial approximation, that is, we fit a p-order polynomial in M V P im on either side of the threshold M V P im = 0:
where δ m are mandate fixed effects, and v s state fixed effects. The coefficientτ 0 identifies the local treatment effect, that is, whether aligned municipalities in close races receive larger transfers from the central government. Standard OLS inference procedures can be applied; we also cluster standard errors at the town level, because the same municipality may be observed in repeated mayoral terms.
The above approach is attractive for many reasons, although a possible concern is that it may be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . To avoid this, the second method we use restricts the estimation to a compact support, and fits linear regression functions to the observations within a distance h on either side of the threshold. In other words, we restrict the sample to municipalities in the interval M V P im ∈ [−h, +h] and estimate the model:
where δ m are mandate fixed effects, v s state fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the town level, and the bandwidth h is selected applying the cross-validation method.
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Again,τ 0 identifies the local treatment effect.
In the empirical analysis, we also check for treatment effect heterogeneity by estimating the local average effect in separate subsamples. Assume D im captures a given heterogeneity dimension (for instance, the presence of a radio station). We estimate:
As a result,τ 0 identifies the treatment effect in D im = 0,τ 0 +β 0 in D im = 1, andβ 0 the difference between the two.
Data sources and sample selection
Data on federal transfers are obtained from the Brazilian National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional ) website, which provides information from municipal and state annual balance
where the predictionsμ h (M V P i ) are retrieved as follows. For every M V P i to the left (right) of the threshold, we predict the value of transfers as if the point were at the boundary of the estimation, using only observations in the interval
. We then calculate the loss function discarding 50% of the observations on either side of the threshold M V P i = 0.
sheets about assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenditure for all Brazilian municipalities and states. Electoral data and information about mayoral characteristics and party affiliation are obtained from the National Electoral Office (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral).
Control variables on town characteristics-such as population size, per-capita income, and so on-are retrieved from the 2000 Brazilian Census.
Basically, every two years there are elections in Brazil. However, federal elections and municipal elections take place at a different time. The exact timing of both federal and municipal elections over our sample period is illustrated in Figure 1 . In fact, our study As for the treatment, we define three different variables indicating whether the municipality is politically aligned with the federal President or not: Two measures of the federal government coalition (broad versus narrow), and the President's party. Table 1 describes our three measures. The broad coalition measure considers all political parties that belonged to the government coalition at some point of each presidential mandate. On the contrary, narrow coalition, for instance, does not consider PMDB as part of the government coalition during the first mandate of Lula (2003 Lula ( -2006 , because this party entered Lula's coalition only at the end of the mandate. Furthermore, the definition of narrow coalition excludes small parties that are not strictly necessary to ensure a parliamentary majority to the government in office.
As a second step, we also check whether opportunistic transfers take place in proximity of federal rather than municipal elections. We thus build an alternative measure of both transfers and President's coalition, referring to the first two years (last two years) of each municipal (federal) mandate. Table 2 reports the modified political coalition variables.
In order to implement our identification strategy in the Brazilian multi-party system, as discussed in the previous section, we must restrict our sample to municipalities where only two candidates run for mayor and one of them is politically aligned with the federal President. To evaluate the external validity of our results, it is thus important to understand how this sample differs from the rest of Brazilian municipalities. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the relevant variables for two different samples (according to our three measures of partisan alignment): two-man races versus other races. 9 These variables are both the town-specific Census characteristics (i.e., the covariates W i that we include in the OLS and difference-in-differences specifications) and the mayor-specific characteristics (i.e., the covariates X im ). The former group includes: population size; per-capita income; the over-20 literacy rate; the rate of urban population;
the fraction of houses with access to water, sewer, or electricity; the presence of a radio station; and geographical location (North, Northeast, Center, South, Southeast). The latter group includes years of schooling, gender, and marital status of the mayor.
On average, municipalities in the two-man races receive more infrastructure transfers both in the first two years and in the last two years of each municipal electoral cycle.
Furthermore, they are smaller, poorer, less literate, with poorer infrastructures (water supply, sewer access, electricity), and have a higher fraction of inhabitants living in rural areas. It is therefore plausible that federal transfers both make a greater difference and are easier to justify when they are targeted at these municipalities.
On the other hand, if we focus on the sample of two-man races, we can preliminary check if there are statistically significant differences between municipalities with a mayor who is aligned with the President and municipalities where the mayor is not aligned. According to the summary statistics reported in Table 4 , municipalities aligned with the President's broad coalition, on average, receive larger per-capita transfers when municipal elections are approaching. There is no descriptive evidence of opportunistic transfers, however, according to the other measures of partisan alignment, or when federal elections are approaching. Looking at the town-specific or mayor-specific characteristics, there is no evidence of "selection on observables" in our sample. Indeed, there are no statisti-cally significant differences between aligned and unaligned municipalities, except for three Brazilian regions in the narrow measure of partisan alignment. This means that municipalities that are politically aligned with the President do not seem to differ from the others in terms of level of development or political selection. This is not particularly relevant for our identification strategy-which accomodates for both selection on observables and unobservables-but it is an additional piece of information on Brazilian politics.
5 Empirical results
Baseline estimates
Our main estimation results are presented in Table 5 . The first, second, and third column report the results for broad coalition, narrow coalition, and party of the president, respectively. Panel A and panel B report the benchmark OLS and difference-in-differences results for both all municipalities and two-man electoral races, respectively. Panel C instead shows the RDD results according to three different estimation methods (split polynomial approximation with full and half bandwidth, and local linear regression with optimal bandwidth).
According to the benchmark cross-sectional and panel evidence, politically aligned municipalities receive more infrastructure transfers. The results of the OLS regressions in the all sample and in two-man races are similar for all three measures of partisan alignment. For all municipalities (panel A), transfers increase by 13.72%, 14.21%, and 11.56%, when the mayor belongs to the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the President, respectively. For tow-man races, the OLS estimates are almost identical. Note, instead, that in the difference-in-differences specifications the estimates are almost the same as OLS when all municipalities are considered. In this case, the per-capita amount of transfers increases by 16.75%, 17.40%, and 11.16% according to our three measures of partisan alignment. On the contrary, the impact of political alignment on transfers is considerably higher when the sample is restricted to two-man races: Transfers increase by 40.20%, 44.77%, and 60.23% if the mayor is affiliated with the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the President, respectively. The above discrepancy might be due to the fact that the difference-in-differences strategy is removing a downward bias in the OLS coefficient, which is present in the two-man but not in the all sample. Yet, also the diff-in-diff results in two-man races may suffer from omitted bias, as long as unobservable confounders vary across mayoral terms.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the main RDD results in (close) two-man races. According to the baseline estimation with split polynomial approximation and full bandwidth as in equation (4), being affiliated with the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the federal President increases the amount of per-capita infrastructure transfers by 35.93%, 39,57%, and 43,27%, respectively. As a robustness check, we also divide by half the bandwidth and estimate again equation (4), finding identical results. We then implement a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth as in equation (5) On one hand, the RDD setup controls for unobservables removing the omitted bias of OLS; on the other hand, the RDD setup focuses on close electoral races only, where the effect of partisan alignment might be higher because of tactical motivations.
Figures 8 through 10 provide a way to tackle this last (interesting) issue. There, we
show the estimated split polynomials in M V P to highlight not only the jump in transfers at M V P = 0, but also the shape of the relationship between transfers and M V P for aligned municipalities (to the right of the zero threshold) and unaligned municipalities (to the left of the zero threshold). Figure 8 clearly shows that the RDD estimate is driven by a sizable cut in transfers to unaligned municipalities close to the zero threshold. In other words, the federal government penalizes municipalities ruled by mayors belonging to the opposition coalition, especially if they won by a narrow margin, thereby tying the hands of its (political) enemies for the next (close) electoral races. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the federal government also gives more money to its strongholds (where M V P is positive and very high) and less to its enemies' strongholds (where M V P is negative and very low), although we do not know if this is driven by the local characteristics of these towns or by political motivations. In addition, note that the tails of the polynomial are not accurately estimated because of the small sample size. 
Robustness checks
In order for our RDD econometric strategy to be internally valid, as discussed in Section 3, political parties must not be able to sort above the threshold of zero margin of victory. In other words, political parties, even when they control the federal government, should not be able to manipulate electoral outcomes in (very) In Table 7 , we further check for discontinuities of town and mayoral characteristics at M V P = 0 by performing a set of balance tests, which are performed estimating equation (4) with town-specific and mayoral characteristics as dependent variables. These robustness exercises have a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, for variables that are predetermined, we should observe no discontinuity, as long as there is no manipulative sorting around the zero threshold. This is the case of the 2000 Census variables and geographic location, which are indeed balanced around the thresholds, excluding a few exceptions (one for narrow and two for broad coalition). On the other hand, for variables that are endogenous to the treatment, a non-zero discontinuity would not cast a shadow on the internal validity of the results, but would suggest a possible channel of the treatment effect. This is the case of mayoral characteristics, as long as political parties are intrinsi-cally different in the observable features of their political candidates in close races. 10 Also mayoral characteristics do not display significant discontinuities at the threshold.
Heterogeneity results
Finally, in Table 8 , we estimate equation (7) to detect heterogeneity (if any) in the treatment effect. We consider three dimensions: whether the mayor has been elected for his first or second mandate (note that there is a two-term limit in Brazil); whether the municipality has a radio station or not; whether population size is above or below the median population of Brazilian municipalities. 11 According to the estimation results, the effect of partisan alignment on transfers is much higher for second-term mayors, in municipalities without a radio station, and in small towns. The interaction effect is indeed always statistically significant for the broad and narrow definitions of President's coalition. For second-term mayors, being politically aligned with the President almost doubles the amount of received transfers according to both coalition definitions. In municipalities without radio station, transfers increase by about 64%, 71%, and 73% if the mayor is affiliated with the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the President, respectively.
The larger (politically motivated) transfers received by second-term mayors might have a twofold explanation: On one hand, politicians with longer experience might count on stronger political connections; on the other hand, the central government might want to compensate for the lower effort of aligned mayors without reelection incentives. Furthermore, (well connected) second-term mayors might put extra effort in attracting resources to run for higher offices and build a political career. The absence of a radio station and the small population size-two features that are highly confounded in our data-might instead allow the mayor to claim more credit for the increased revenues, therefore raising the political reward from intergovernmental grants. In small municipalities, in fact, local institutions may well be the major source of political information for citizens, while the presence of a radio station may increase the ability of the President or congressmen to publicize their role in allocating federal resources to a given municipality.
Conclusions and future research
In this paper, we document the existence of (sizable) tactical motivations in the allocation of federal transfers by the Brazilian federal government, aimed at penalizing unaligned municipalities where mayors belonging to the opposition coalition won by a narrow margin. Our RDD estimates-which accommodate for the presence of both time-invariant and time-varying confounding factors-show that mayors politically aligned with the Brazilian President receive larger federal transfers in close electoral races, by an amount that varies from 36% to 43% according to the used estimation method or measure of partisan alignment. The results are statistically significant only for federal transfers received in the last two years of the (four-year) mayoral term, therefore pointing to the existence of a relevant political budget cycle in Brazilian municipal revenues.
As future research, we are going to extend the above results in multiple directions. In particular, we plan:
• to further evaluate the robustness of the results presented in this paper by means of falsification tests and functional-form sensitivity checks;
• to repeat our estimations with data on additional types of (discretionary) federal transfers to Brazilian municipalities;
• to estimate the differential incumbency advantage of aligned versus unaligned mayors, applying again the RDD methodology proposed by Lee (2008) . and Electricity are the fraction of houses with access to water supply, sewer, and electricity, respectively; Radio captures whether there is at least one local radio station in the municipality. Years of schooling, male, and married refer to the characteristics of the mayor. North, Northeast, Center, South, and Southeast are macro-regions. Notes. Two-man races only. Aligned municipalities are those where the winner is affiliated with the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the president, respectively. Non aligned municipalities are those where the winner is not affiliated with the broad coalition, narrow coalition, or party of the president, respectively. All columns except those with p-value report the average values in the respective subsamples; p-value refers to the statistical significance of the difference between means.
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